Nanaia Mahuta’s latest China comments show the Government is committed to tackling concerns about economic over-reliance – but Australian belligerence and chest-beating is more likely to hinder than help that cause, Sam Sachdeva writes
The risk of Australia’s ongoing trade spat with China making its way to New Zealand in the immediate future may be less than that of a Covid-infected Melburnian – but that does not mean our Government is any less worried about the prospect.
In an interview with The Guardian this week, Foreign Affairs Minister Nanaia Mahuta shared her concern that the experience of our trans-Tasman neighbours could yet be felt closer to home, as she made the case for greater economic diversification.
“We cannot ignore, obviously, what’s happening in Australia with their relationship with China. And if they are close to an eye of the storm or in the eye of the storm, we’ve got to legitimately ask ourselves – it may only be a matter of time before the storm gets closer to us.”
It was a similar message to that from her New Zealand China Council speech last month, but with a more frank tone (perhaps she is picking up Winston Peters’ habit of delivering greater candour to international media than those closer to home).
Taken together, it is increasingly clear this is not some passing phase but a concerted effort to shift both government policy and the approach of Kiwi exporters.
More broadly, our intelligence agencies have developed guidance for academics and politicians designed to ward off foreign interference, while Parliament has unanimously backed a motion expressing concern about serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang (albeit falling short of the declaration of genocide that some wanted).
Yet the good people at 60 Minutes Australia seem to believe Kiwis are eagerly sowing CCP patches onto our breast pockets in preparation for life as a vassal state.
It could be argued that attempting to seriously analyse this mouth-frothing hysteria bestows it with a credibility it does not deserve; the programme hardly helps its case in that regard by turning to Mike Hosking for analysis (he is undoubtedly an expert on striking t-shirt/jacket combinations, but less so on foreign policy).
At least, that is the only impression that can be taken from their breathless promotional trailer for an upcoming episode apparently focused on New Zealand betraying our bigger brother.
“Just what are the Kiwis up to now?” a gravelly voice-over asks. “We thought they were our best friends, but it looks like they’ve ditched us for a fast Chinese buck.”
As a red-hued Xi Jinping is superimposed over the New Zealand flag, another rhetorical question comes forth: “Could it be that New Zealand is turning into New Xi-land?”
It could be argued that attempting to seriously analyse this mouth-frothing hysteria bestows it with a credibility it does not deserve; the programme hardly helps its case in that regard by turning to Mike Hosking for analysis (he is undoubtedly an expert on striking t-shirt/jacket combinations, but less so on foreign policy).
But the thrust of the argument is one that appears to have at least some credibility amongst more respected actors across the ditch and elsewhere – that New Zealand is a weak link in the Five Eyes alliance, more concerned about protecting trade ties than speaking out on human rights.
It is a topic almost certain to be at the forefront when Jacinda Ardern and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison meet in Queenstown on Sunday and Monday, if not behind closed doors then at the press conference which follows.
In fairness, New Zealand has been slower than Australia to have some of the necessary debates around foreign interference and striking a balance between economic benefit and security concerns.
There is also still some way to go in terms of transparency, as evidenced by the Politik site revealing this week National and Labour quietly agreed last year their respective Chinese MPs Jian Yang and Raymond Huo would retire after intelligence briefings raised security concerns – concerns which have never been publicly disclosed.
“When it comes to China, Australia and New Zealand will provide an instructive case for whether it pays to be nice to Beijing, or if it simply isn’t worth the bother.”
But the very fact that action was taken, and the wider change in tone around the political relationship, offers proof that New Zealand is hardly blind to concerns about China or unwilling to act for fear of financial repercussions.
It is not as if Australia has entirely decoupled itself from China, either.
The Asian superpower remains Australia’s largest trading partner, with nearly 40 percent of all exports going there in the 2019/20 year, while its total exports to China for the 2020 calendar year were down just 2.2 percent from 2019 despite the trade spat (thanks largely to rising prices for iron ore).
And if the theory is that New Zealand is benefiting from increased trade volumes in the sectors where Australian businesses have suffered, we would not be alone.
While the United States has said it will not “leave Australia alone on the field” against Chinese aggression, that does not seem to have prevented it from growing its exports of wine, wood and coal to China while Canberra has faced restrictions on the same commodities – yet there do not seem to be any suggestions the US has betrayed Australia.
Writing for the Lowy Institute, Elliott Zaagman suggested the differences on China between Australia and New Zealand were less in substance and more in tone, with the Morrison government’s overtly combative stance set against the more subtle approach of Ardern’s team.
“When it comes to China, Australia and New Zealand will provide an instructive case for whether it pays to be nice to Beijing, or if it simply isn’t worth the bother.”
Misreading that as a fundamental difference of opinion, and seeking to browbeat New Zealand on that front, is less likely to inspire a change of approach and more likely to see us stay on our current course.