Opinion: Last week, Newsroom reported on the recent restructure at the Department of Conservation, which resulted in the removal of a deputy-director general role. 

I have had both the burden and privilege of working with DoC for over 20 years for a range of organisations and clients. In my experience, the department is capable of reflecting the best values of Kiwis: the mixture of passion, wisdom and hands-on practical effort that once built the country. However, at its worst, it can also embody the ‘we know best’ bureaucratic bloody-mindedness Kiwis are also well capable of. Over the past decade, I have sadly seen some parts of DoC shift from the former mindset to the latter, and seemingly, with little desire to improve. 

Rightly or wrongly, I see DoC’s engine room not as the rangers on the front line (which should drive its culture), but the staff within the planning and permissions team. In those 10 years this team’s performance in my opinion was almost universally poor. The difficulty in making such bold statements is that when central government makes a decision, especially in a charged environment such as conservation, there are winners and losers. People are not always going to agree. 

However, if the culture of a team has become about disrespect for the law, policy, and an insistence that it just knows best, then it’s a different story. DoC’s planning and permissions team, and its bosses, have been no stranger to controversy and judicial comment. A few examples:

  • In 2014, the Ombudsman described DoC’s decision-making as “nonsense on stilts”, in relation to the department approving a doubling of guided walkers on the Routeburn Track, contravening the Mt Aspiring National Park Management Plan, which limited the number of these walkers. DoC had claimed “exceptional circumstances”, a concept that does not exist in law or policy. In this case, the department never cancelled the doubling of the guided walk numbers. 
  • In 2017, the Ombudsman described DoC’s decision-making as “unreasonable, and [potentially] contrary to law”, in response to it approving up to 70 helicopter landings a day in a remote part of Fiordland National Park, where the plan limits it to 10. DoC cancelled the extra landings, again claiming ‘exceptional circumstances’. 
  • In 2021, it attempted to get around a rule in a higher order policy – the West Coast Conservation Management Strategy – by unlawfully changing the rules in the lower order document, the Paparoa National Park Management Plan, to enable helicopter flights into a part of Paparoa National Park intended to remain quiet and free from aircraft noise. Despite strenuous advice to the contrary from the community, DoC, and its own supposedly independent oversight agency, the New Zealand Conservation Authority, signed off on the proposals (on DoC’s advice). However, the High Court found differently, describing a “significant derogation”, and changed the park plan rules back to what they should have been, awarding costs against the department and the Conservation Authority. DoC again claimed exceptional circumstances. 

DoC’s planning and permissions team showed over a 10-year period, at least in public, that they cared little for the rule of law and policy on public land – if it got in the way of tourism or development. Repeated judicial comments and interventions, as well as media investigations, did not change the culture of decision-making within this team. The sad thing is, with some humility and a reading of their own legislation, there were pathways through most of this. Pathways that would have brought people along with them.

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes, or, ‘Who will guard the guards’, is the question that democracies, and those who value the rule of law, face. If the guards of our public lands have a culture of expediency and rule-bending, and their culture is seemingly impervious to repeated judicial intervention, then what can seriously be done?

DoC remains an organisation with no independent oversight, other than the courts, and largely voluntary organisations who choose to keep an eye on them.

(Apart from the approval of national park management plans, conservation boards are advisory only, with no independent functions or, critically, a budget of their own. It’s the same for the New Zealand Conservation Authority – no independent powers, apart from the final approval of national park management plans and general policies for national parks, no independent budget, no powers of investigation. There’s an illusion of oversight and accountability, but nothing in law or even practically functional by way of a budget.)

It’s this lack of oversight that enables regulatory cultures to become toxic. I don’t doubt that there were, and are, still principled individuals within the department, who internally resisted some of the behaviour and spoke against it, but for whatever reason, managers did not listen or act. 

If even the traditionally warring public and stakeholders could agree – not perhaps on the decisions, but that parts of DoC were so broken they couldn’t even run a lawful process – the sounding of that warning siren should have triggered a response either in senior management or from a minister (these issues occurred under both National-led and Labour-led governments). But it didn’t. The same managers in planning and permissions continued on, and some were even promoted. 

I have tried to reflect on why it happened, and how a culture in a regulatory agency deteriorated to the point it could not learn from mistakes, and instead doubled down.

People get into conservation to make a difference, for passion and vocational reasons, because conservation almost certainly isn’t about the money. The motivations are many and varied, but usually centre around a love for the outdoors, for species, for people, and to nurture, care, and protect New Zealand’s special places. With shared values, and even lacking that, shared trench-like experiences of being the thin green line in environmental disputes can result in conservation department staff forming tighter bonds than in other organisations. 

This closeness can make top management blind to poor performance with their mates. This is noble cause corruption, the deaf tin-ear, where the department became so insistent, and too close to the work, that no change was possible. The more criticism you receive, the more you have it right.

Flaws of colleagues and the warning sirens of oversight agencies (and the media) were ignored, swept under the rug, hoping for the best next time. Mates-based management may indeed be the Achilles heel of a small country like New Zealand. 

It is early days, but there are positive signs of a return to professionalism. The relatively new director-general, Penny Nelson, has cleaned out her top brass and replaced them with experienced managers from other public service agencies – caring about conservation, yes, but with enough distance to see the flaws without emotion. Nelson’s decision to replace former deputy director-general Marie Long was the right one, but the planning and permissions division will need ongoing oversight and firm direction to reset its culture. 

Furthermore, the risk of mates-based management doesn’t just apply to old rangers, it’s equally a problem in the close-knit Wellington public service culture. The challenge now for DoC is ensuring the pendulum doesn’t swing back to the other extreme. I’m confident it won’t, but the number of issues emerging from the bulging rug under which they were swept may serve as a reminder. 

Peter Wilson is an independent conservation and recreation planner, former DoC statutory planner and former president of the Federated Mountain Clubs of New Zealand.

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10 Comments

  1. An unexpected and unfortunate outcome of the public sector changes in the late 1980s has been to narrow the oversight of agencies to little more than fiscal matters. Parliamentary oversight is weak in New Zealand, and we are totally dependent on the auditor-general, ombudsman and environment commissioner and several less independent roles. The authority of the Treasury has been reduced. The next public services commissioner will be a critical agent in rebuilding the public sector leadership capability.

  2. This comment also relates to Local Government. The Local Government Act (which I actively engaged in its final form) has flaws, which I can now see, which need to be addressed. One key problem is that elected reps can only appoint the CE. This has not worked many times. Appointing a flawed CE who appoints a weak/flawed ELT has led to disaster many times in LG. Appointing “modern” managers rather than those knowledgeable with a sector which has complex local demands are often mishandled by these appointees. The elected reps must have a say into the appointment of members of the ELT. It’s time for LG to review the LG Act.

  3. It is the nature of the Public Service to grow at the point where it meets politicians and therefore makes policy. That is of course in Wellington and that is where the growth in DOC has occurred and where the decisions are made. But that is not where a Department like Conservation gets its results. That is in the field and with the people who use the Conservation estate. And it is feedback from there that should guide policy and advise politicians.

  4. This issue has developed in parallel with the increase in environmental planners influencing decisions. In my experience many planners have little or any practical knowledge of the issues they are commenting on but are substantially influenced by the outcome their superiors or clients want. Highly qualified technical advisors are often ignored as a result.

    1. Planners without independent oversight and scrutiny are damned dangerous.

  5. “The more criticism you receive, the more you have it right”
    +
    “but the number of issues emerging from the bulging rug under which they were swept may serve as a reminder”

    Wonderfully succint statements of dysfunction that I have witnessed in other industries, but only through reading this now realise it was indeed caused by a group of mates at the top deluding each other.

  6. I’m reminded of the Noble report on the Cave Creek disaster. Two lessons from that were the dangers of casual (well-intentioned but desperately under-resourced) local management, and the need for top management in Wellington making sure that those in the field were aware of current legislative requirements. Sadly, it was regional management that had to fall on its sword. Wellington ducked the consequences – till the next government.
    The broader issue, beyond DOC, is the often-unhelpful culture in the public service in its relationships with the public and between different disciplines and ministries. Although I have nothing but praise for the individual public servants I’ve had to work with – they were competent, knowledgeable, dedicated and helpful – it’s been hard making initial approaches. Knocking on the door has turned into knocking on a brick wall. Painful. And, ultimately, unhelpful to both parties.
    What to do, and where to start? I’ve been heartened over the last year or so by a couple of thoughts introduced on these pages by Lianne Dalziel. The first was the idea of radical collaboration – working together in a way that’s beyond mere cooperation. The second, in the context of the UK Post Office scandal, was the need for a culture of candour.

    1. My suggestion is to get actual independent regulators with teeth, and open these places up to both new ideas, and consequences for bad ones that go wrong.

  7. The one actor missing in this analysis is the government of the day. Many of the DoC decisions derided in this piece could be interpreted as responses to policy and financial decisions from above. Where you have a government of a conservative ethos DoC will be required to manage on less and find alternative sources of income – like increasing the number of walkers or helicopter landings – even when such actions are seen as anti-environmental. I am not defending them, but we need to understand that context rather than just blaming planners and managers in DoC who often find themselves forced to make unpalatable decisions. Otherwise we let the politicians off the hook and put the blame on those further down the power hierarchy.

    1. Thanks Peter, these issues occurred under both Labour-led and National-led governments. The interesting feature of the drivers for them is it wasn’t money for DOC – DOC spend more money managing their commercial licenses and concessions than they earn from them (something like a paltry $15 million or so, out of a total budget of $800M). The drivers were simply – hey I have a good idea for tourism – I made some promises to a group of powerful people, so make it happen. Financial analysis and making an extra buck didn’t even enter into it – that’s how silly it all was.

      And, if they had wanted to do it properly, they could have just changed their plans, brought the public along with them, presented the proposal. That’s how it’s usually done. Instead DOC invented their own mini version of the fast-track bill, but with even less scrutiny than the one currently making its way through select committee (which, liked or not, will still be actual law).

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