Analysis: “Entirely unreliable.” That’s the Auditor-General’s assessment of the Defence Force’s performance reports – and might well be the assessment of the Defence Force, full stop.
Auditor-General John Ryan (whose office’s work impresses more and more with every reading) has quietly pointed out to a Parliamentary committee that the Defence Force’s claim to have achieved 83 percent of its performance measures has to be treated with more than just the proverbial pinch of salt. It needs an emergency airlift aid delivery sack of the stuff.
A pattern has emerged where readiness targets are set to 100 percent each year – only to be reduced part-way through the year. “One capability target was reduced to zero percent in each of the last three years,” he notes. “The lowest target is then reported against as being met, so the results are entirely unreliable.”
I’ve dug into the Auditor-General’s select committee briefing. Among the targets that have been “regularly” cut part-way through the year, to give a false impression that they’ve been achieved, are troop readiness for deployment.
The Navy was deemed to achieved its targeted capability for maritime warfare and security operations despite the unavailability of its two frigates Te Kaha and Te Mana while they were being upgraded. That’s because the targets were cut.
The Army mets it targets for Combined Arms Operations – because its targets were repeatedly cut to zero percent, citing the impact of Covid.
The Air Force met its (reduced) target for supporting Naval Operations, despite obsolescence problems with the eight Seasprite helicopters. It met the (reduced) target for Strategic Air Mobility, despite problems with its two Boeing 757s’ maintenance, supply chain and engine availability. It met the (reduced) target for Air Surveillance and Response, despite the early withdrawal of the P-3 Orions due to attrition of maintenance personnel.
What is even more extraordinary is how many targets the Defence Force still failed to meet, even when it was juking the stats! It failed 22 of its 109 targets – including failing to deliver timely and accurate advice to government.
The Auditor-General finds these shifting targets are problematic, because Defence is funded to meet 100 percent of these targets, which are set by Government. MPs were advised to ask whether there would, or should, be adverse funding implications for this failure to genuinely deliver.
The foreign affairs, defence and trade select committee agrees, saying it has “concerns about this way of achieving targets”.
The Office of the Auditor-General reviews the performance of every single government agency, every single year. And it believes this jiggery-pokery is unprecedented. The criticism must, in my view, raise some serious questions about Defence Force leadership.
Chief of Defence, Air Marshal Kevin Short, has wailed publicly about armed personnel attrition (more than 30 percent in two years) and an urgent need for capital investment in armoured vehicles and boats and, of course, its aged Boeing 757s that seem incapable of ever becoming airborne.
My colleague Emma Hatton reports that the cost of maintaining the two passenger jets has increased from $8m a year to $32m so far this year – and we’re only partway through the financial year.
Short, who’s due to retire next month, said he had “zero comfort” with the Government’s planned spending cuts. He warned the select committee of a “risk of failure” and said so-called back-office cost cutting could ground maritime helicopters to “get them off the books”.
Four key vessels are docked, lacking the sailors and engineers to put to sea. Planes and helicopters are grounded by maintenance woes and the loss of one in three trained staff. Newsroom has previously reported that New Zealand may have to ask for help from Australia to deploy troops.
Defence Minister Judith Collins initially talked tough about getting more money for the military, despite the Government’s required 6.5 to 7.5 percent budget cuts. Now, she’s pulled back, saying there will be no new money for staff or assets – and it’s easy to see why she’s become more cautious.
She too will be questioning what confidence she can have in top brass who quietly shift their performance targets to make themselves look less bad. She will be asking whether the attrition and retention rates and poor asset management are less a result of under-funding, and more a reflection of leadership trouble.
And here’s a big question: is the attrition rate even that high? According to the Auditor-General, the attrition rate is lower than the public sector average – so is the wailing and gnashing of teeth all an attempt to scam more public money?
The Auditor-General did acknowledge concerns with attrition and retention, but makes the point that the Defence Force’s 2022/23 attrition rate was 14.1 percent, compared to a historically high public sector average of 15.9 percent.
Collins can’t sack Short. (Only the Governor-General can revoke his warrant, on the advice of the Executive Council). The independence of military leadership is constitutionally protected, as it should be. And anyway, he’s retiring next month.
But the Defence Minister – like the Auditor-General and the select committee – would be right to demand much-improved performance from Defence leadership before even contemplating more funding.
One thing is certain: the new Chief of Defence can’t be allowed to set their own KPIs.
Correction: An earlier version of this article colloquially referred to pleas for capital investment in “tanks”. In fact, the intended capital investment is in trucks and Bushmaster armoured vehicles.
The collapse in defence is nothing short of disgraceful. It is clearly a leadership issue. Why the four defence heads had their time-in-job doubled is beyond everyone. If this was a company the whole executive team would be sacked. They must not pick the next Defence boss from the heads of Army, navy or air force who are clearly incompetent. This is where Collins needs to act.
There is a lot to unpack here. Firstly, the NZDF does not have enough capital funding, as is seen with the 757s. Also, opex funding does not keep pace with the new capabilities that are way more complex than the kit from the 80s and therefore cost more to train and maintain on. New kit requires much higher levels of opex than what it replaces and the personnel using/maintaining it require much higher training/skill levels.
Along side that, remuneration for many roles is inadequate when compared to similar private sector roles, especially when you consider the unlimited liability service personnel face. NZDF personnel share notes with our ABCANZ and NATO allies when on deployments and see how little they are valued – the Australians income is tax free, for example, when on deployments.
As to the impact of attrition. Much of that is in the “mid-level” NCO/Officer ranks, where years of training costs have been invested. To put it into perspective, a LTCOL (top end of the mid-level) will have had 3+ years of training to get to that rank (approx after 15 years). On top of that is months of exercises and, typically, years of operational deployments. The cost of that training is not insignificant, nor is the experience walking out the door.
This means we have significant “hollowness” in the NZDF. For example, I doubt the NZ Army could provide a single, fully staffed, light or motorised infantry battalion at the moment given the parlous state of the two regular force infantry battalions.
To meet the previous 2025 goals of battalion sized battle group on operations would require reserves for the 1st rotation , and the Reserve numbers have dwindled due to poor decisions. The planning in 2019 was for a sustainable contribution of 1200 soldiers (for combat ops and HADR). I do not believe this is even remotely achievable.
In the end, NZ has a NZDF that it is willing to pay for. On the current spend, that is not a lot.
The initial article raised my hackles. Then I read Holley’s comments and realised that there’s rather more to it than met the eye. It seems to me that there’s plenty of content for a robust public discussion minus the political element. Let’s hope we get such, without fiery heat and personal attacks
This indicates that Defence is in a very bad state.
What we need now is a clear evaluation of how they contribute to our security.
Aotearoa / New Zealand does not need a fighting force. We need disaster and emergency response capability. Those two aspects of the force need to be weeded into two categories. I doubt that there is much money lacking for the essential second category.
I thought CDF wasn’t Constitutionally protected? The Defence Act contains none of the provisions that protect appointments that are in other laws (like for the Ombudsman, or judges). Is the protection somewhere else?